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Dynamic Epistemic Logic as a Substructural
Logic
Guillaume Aucher
Abstract Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) is an influential logical framework for
reasoning about the dynamics of beliefs and knowledge. It has been related to older
and more established logical frameworks. Despite these connections, DEL remains,
arguably, a rather isolated logic in the vast realm of non-classical logics and modal
logics. This is problematic if logic is to be viewed ultimately as a unified and uni-
fying field and if we want to avoid that DEL goes on “riding off madly in all di-
rections” (a metaphor used by van Benthem about logic in general). In this article,
we show that DEL can be redefined naturally and meaningfully as a two-sorted
substructural logic. In fact, it is even one of the most primitive substructural logics
since it does not preserve any of the structural rules. Moreover, the ternary seman-
tics of DEL and its dynamic interpretation provides a conceptual foundation for the
Routley & Meyer’s semantics of substructural logics.
Key words: Dynamic Epistemic Logic, Substructural Logics, Update, Ternary Re-
lation, Dynamic Inference
1 Introduction
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) is an influential logical framework for reasoning
about the dynamics of beliefs and knowledge, which has drawn the attention of a
number of researchers ever since the seminal publication of [17]. A number of con-
tributions have linked DEL to older and more established logical frameworks: it has
been embedded into (automata) PDL [40, 34], it has been given an algebraic se-
mantics [8, 9], and it has been related to epistemic temporal logic [32, 6] and the
situation calculus [31, 38]. Many of these links have been established by van Ben-
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them himself. Despite these connections, DEL remains, arguably, a rather isolated
logic in the vast realm of non-classical logics and modal logics. This is problematic
if logic is to be viewed ultimately as a unified and unifying field and if we want to
avoid that DEL goes on “riding off madly in all directions” (a metaphor used by van
Benthem [28, 30] about logic in general). In this article, we will show that DEL can
be redefined naturally and meaningfully as a two-sorted substructural logic. In fact,
it is even one of the most primitive substructural logics since it does not preserve
any of the structural rules.
Substructural logics will also benefit from this interaction with DEL. The well-
known semantics for substructural logics is based on a ternary relation introduced
by Routley & Meyer for relevance logic in the 1970’s [60, 61, 59, 62]. However, the
introduction of this ternary relation was originally motivated by technical reasons,
and it turns out that providing a non-circular and conceptually grounded interpreta-
tion of this relation remains problematic [18]. As we shall see, the ternary semantics
of DEL provides a conceptual foundation for Routley & Meyer’s semantics. In fact,
the dynamic interpretation induced by the DEL framework turns out to be not only
meaningful, but also consistent with the interpretations of this ternary relation pro-
posed in the substructural literature.
The article is structured as follows. In Section 2 we recall the core of DEL viewed
from a semantic perspective. In Section 3 we briefly recall elementary notions of rel-
evance and substructural logics and we observe that the ternary relation of relevance
logic can be interpreted as a sort of update. In Section 4 we proceed further to define
a substructural language based on this idea. This substructural language extends the
DEL language with operators stemming from the Lambek calculus (a substructural
logic), but we show that these different substructural operators actually correspond
to the DEL operators of [3, 4]. This allows us to show that DEL is a (two-sorted)
substructural logic. In this section we also formally relate these operators to the dy-
namic inferences introduced by van Benthem [23]. In Section 5 we conclude and I
give some personal views about the future of DEL and logical dynamics.
2 Dynamic Epistemic Logic
Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) is a relatively recent non-classical logic [17] which
extends ordinary modal epistemic logic [45] by the inclusion of event/action mod-
els (called Lα–models in this article) to describe actions, and a product update
operator that defines how epistemic models (called L –models in this article) are
updated as the consequence of executing actions described through event models
(see [10, 37, 30] for more details). So, the methodology of DEL is such that it splits
the task of representing the agents’ beliefs and knowledge into three parts: first, one
represents their beliefs/knowledge about an initial situation; second, one represents
their beliefs/knowledge about an event taking place in this situation; third, one rep-
resents the way the agents update their beliefs/knowledge about the situation after
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(or during) the occurrence of the event. Following this methodology, we also split
the exposition of the DEL framework into three sections.
2.1 Representation of the Initial Situation:L -model
In the rest of this article, AT M is a countable set of propositional letters called
atomic facts which describe static situations, and AGT := {1, . . . ,m} is a finite set
of agents.
Definition 1 (Language L and L –structure). We define the language L induc-
tively as follows:
L : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | ϕ ∨ϕ |  jϕ
where p ranges over AT M and j over AGT . We define ⊥ := p∧¬p for a chosen
p ∈ AT M and we also define > := ¬⊥. The formula ♦ jϕ is an abbreviation for
¬ j¬ϕ , the formula ϕ→ ψ is an abbreviation for ¬ϕ ∨ψ , and the formula ϕ↔ ψ
is an abbreviation for (ϕ → ψ)∧ (ψ → ϕ).
AL -structure is defined inductively as follows, with ϕ ranging overL :
X ::= ϕ | (X ,X)
We abusively write ϕ ∈ X when the formula ϕ ∈L is a substructure of X .
A (pointed)L –model (M ,w) represents how the actual world represented by w
is perceived by the agents. Atomic facts are used to state properties of this actual
world.
Definition 2 (L -model). AL -model is a tupleM = (W,R1, . . . ,Rm, I) where:
• W is a non-empty set of possible worlds,
• R j ⊆W ×W is an accessibility relation on W , for each j ∈ AGT ,
• I : W → 2AT M is a function assigning to each possible world a subset of AT M.
The function I is called an interpretation.
We write w ∈M for w ∈W , and (M ,w) is called a pointed L -model (w often
represents the actual world). We denote by C the set of pointedL –models. If w,v∈
W , we write wR jv or (M ,w)R j(M ,v) for (w,v) ∈ R j, and R j(w) denotes the set
{v ∈W | wR jv}.
Intuitively, wR jv means that in world w agent j considers that world v might
correspond to the actual world. Then, we define the following epistemic language
that can be used to describe and state properties ofL –models:
Definition 3 (Truth conditions ofL ). LetM be aL -model, w ∈M and ϕ ∈L .
M ,w ϕ is defined inductively as follows:
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Fig. 1 Cards Example
M ,w p iff p ∈ I(w)
M ,w ¬ψ iff notM ,w ϕ
M ,w ϕ ∧ψ iff M ,w ϕ andM ,w ψ
M ,w ϕ ∨ψ iff M ,w ϕ orM ,w ψ
M ,w  jϕ iff for all v ∈ R j(w),M ,v ϕ
We writeM ϕ whenM ,w ϕ for all w ∈M , and ϕ when for allL -model
M ,M ϕ . AL -formula ϕ is said to be valid if ϕ . We extend the scope of the
relation to also relate pointedL –models to structures:
M ,w X ,Y iff M ,w X andM ,w Y
Let C be a class of pointed L –models, let X ,Y be L -structures. We say that X
entails Y in the class C, written X
C
Y , when the following holds:
X
C
Y iff for all pointedL -model (M ,w) ∈C, if for all ϕ ∈ X M ,w ϕ ,
then there is ψ ∈ Y such thatM ,w ψ .
We also write X Y for X
C
Y , where C is the class of all pointedL –models.
The formula  jϕ reads as “agent j believes ϕ”. Its truth conditions are defined
in such a way that agent j believes ϕ is true in a possible world when ϕ holds in all
the worlds agent j considers possible.
Example 1. Assume that agents A, B and C play a card game with three cards: a
white one, a red one and a blue one. Each of them has a single card but they do
not know the cards of the other players. At each step of the game, some of the
players show their/her/his card to another player or to both other players, either
privately or publicly. We want to study and represent the dynamics of the agents’
beliefs/knowledge in this game. The initial situation is represented by the pointed
L -model (M ,w) of Figure 1.
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In this example, AGT := {A,B,C} and AT M := {r j,b j,w j | j ∈ AGT} where r j
stands for ‘agent j has the red card’, b j stands for ‘agent j has the blue card’ and w j
stands for ‘agent j has the white card’. The boxed possible world corresponds to the
actual world. The propositional letters not mentioned in the possible worlds do not
hold in these possible worlds. The accessibility relations are represented by arrows
indexed by agents between possible worlds. Reflexive arrows are omitted in the
figure, which means that for all worlds v ∈M and all agents j ∈ AGT , v ∈ R j(v). In
this model, we have for example the following statement:M ,w (wB∧¬AwB)∧
C¬AwB. It states that player A does not ‘know’ that player B has the white card
and player C ‘knows’ it.
2.2 Representation of the Event:Lα -model
The language Lα was introduced in [11]. The propositional letters pψ describing
events are called atomic events and range over AT Mα = {pψ
∣∣ ψ ranges over L }.
The reading of pψ is “an event of precondition ψ is occurring”.
Definition 4 (Language Lα and Lα–structure). We define the language Lα in-
ductively as follows:
Lα : α ::= pψ | ¬α | α ∧α | α ∨α |  jα
where ψ ranges overL and j over AGT . We define⊥ := pψ ∧¬pψ for a chosen
ψ ∈L and we define > := ¬⊥. The formula ♦ jα is an abbreviation for ¬ j¬α ,
the formula α → β is an abbreviation for ¬α ∨ β , and the formula α ↔ β is an
abbreviation for (α → β )∧ (β → α).
ALα -structure is defined inductively as follows, with β ranging overLα :
Sα : Xα ::= β | (Xα ,Xα)
We abusively write α ∈ Xα when the formula α ∈Lα is a substructure of Xα .
A pointed Lα -model (E ,e) represents how the actual event represented by e is
perceived by the agents. Intuitively, f ∈ R j(e) means that while the possible event
represented by e is occurring, agent j considers possible that the possible event
represented by f is actually occurring.
Definition 5 (Lα–model, [17]). A Lα -model is a tuple E = (Wα ,R1, . . . ,Rm, I)
where:
• Wα is a non-empty set of possible events,
• R j ⊆Wα ×Wα is an accessibility relation on Wα , for each j ∈ AGT ,
• I : Wα →L is a function assigning to each possible event a formula of L . The
function I is called the precondition function.
Let P be a subset of L . A P–complete Lα–model is a Lα–model which satisfies
moreover the following condition:
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Fig. 2 Players A and B show their cards to each other in front of player C
• I(e) ∈ P, for each e ∈Wα (P-complete)
We write e ∈ E for e ∈Wα , and (E ,e) is called a pointed Lα -model (e often
represents the actual event). We denote by Cα the set of pointed Lα–models, by
C Pα the set of pointed P-complete event models. If e, f ∈Wα , we write eR j f or
(E ,e)R j(E , f ) for (e, f ) ∈ R j, and R j(e) denotes the set { f ∈Wα | eR j f}.
The truth conditions of the language Lα are identical to the truth conditions of
the languageL :
Definition 6 (Truth conditions ofLα ). Let E be aLα -model, e ∈ E and α ∈Lα .
E ,e α is defined inductively as follows:
E ,e pψ iff I(e) = ψ
E ,e ¬α iff not E ,e α
E ,e α ∧β iff E ,e α and E ,e β
E ,e α ∨β iff E ,e α or E ,e β
E ,e  jα iff for all f ∈ R j(e),E , f α
Let C be a class of pointedLα–models, let Xα ,Yα beLα–structures. We say that
X entails Y in the class C, written Xα C Yα , when the following holds:
Xα C Yα iff for all pointedLα -model (E ,e) ∈C,
if for all α ∈ Xα E ,e α , then there is β ∈ Yα such that E ,e β .
We also write Xα Yα for Xα Cα Yα , where Cα is the class of all pointed Lα–
models.
Example 2. Let us resume Example 1 and assume that players A and B show their
card to each other. As it turns out, C noticed that A showed her card to B but did
not notice that B did so to A. Players A and B know this. This event is represented
in the Lα -model (E ,e) of Figure 2. The boxed possible event e corresponds to the
actual event ‘player A shows her red card’ (with precondition rA), f stands for the
event ‘player A shows her white card’ (with precondition wA) and g stands for the
atomic event ‘players A and B show their red and white cards respectively to each
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Fig. 3 Public announcementLα -model of rA
other’ (with precondition rA∧wB). The following statement holds in the example of
Figure 2:
E ,e prA ∧ (♦A prA ∧A prA)∧ (♦B prA ∧B prA)
∧ (♦C pwA ∧♦C prA∧wA ∧C (pwA ∨ prA∧wA)) (1)
It states that players A and B show their cards to each other, players A and B ‘know’
this and consider it possible, while player C considers possible that player A shows
her white card and also considers possible that player A shows her red card, since he
does not know her card. In fact, that is all that player C considers possible since he
believes that either player A shows her red card or her white card. Another example
of Lα -model is given in Figure 3. This second example corresponds to the event
whereby Players A shows her card publicly to everybody.
The following statement holds in the example of Figure 3:
E ,e prA ∧A prA ∧B prA ∧C prA
∧AA prA ∧AB prA ∧AC prA
∧BA prA ∧BB prA ∧BC prA
∧CA prA ∧CB prA ∧CC prA
∧ . . .
It states that player A shows her red card and that players A, B and C ‘know’ it,
that players A, B and C ‘know’ that each of them ‘know’ it, etc. . . in other words,
there is common knowledge among players A, B and C that player A shows her red
card.1
E ,e prA ∧∗AGT prA .
2.3 Update of the Initial Situation by the Event: Product Update
The DEL product update of [17] is defined as follows. This update yields a newL -
model (M ,w)⊗ (E ,e) representing how the new situation which was previously
1 We write E ,e ∗AGTα when for all f ∈
( ⋃
j∈AGT
R j
)∗
(e), E , f α . See for example [41] for
a detailed study of the operator ∗AGT of common knowledge
8 Guillaume Aucher
(w,w′) : rA,bC,wB
C
ww
C
''
A,B

rA,bC,wB
C
//

rB,bC,wAoo
A

rA,bB,wC
A
OO
rC,bB,wA
OO
Fig. 4 Situation after the update of the situation represented in Figure 1 by the event represented
in Figure 2
represented by (M ,w) is perceived by the agents after the occurrence of the event
represented by (E ,e).
Definition 7 (Product update). Let (M ,w) = (W,R1, . . . ,Rm, I,w) be a pointed
L -model and let (E ,e) = (Wα ,R1, . . . ,Rm, I,e) be a pointed Lα -model such that
M ,w I(e). The product update of (M ,w) and (E ,e) is the pointed L -model
(M ⊗E ,(w,e)) = (W⊗,R⊗1 , . . . ,R⊗m , I⊗,(w,e)) defined as follows: for all v ∈W and
all f ∈Wα ,
• W⊗ = {(v, f ) ∈W ×Wα |M ,v I( f )},
• R⊗j (v, f ) = {(u,g) ∈W⊗ | u ∈ R j(v) and g ∈ R j( f )},
• I⊗(v, f ) = I(v).
Example 3. As a result of the event described in Example 2, the agents update their
beliefs. We get the situation represented in theL -model (M ,w)⊗ (E ,e) of Figure
4. In thisL –model, we have for example the following statement:
(M ,w)⊗ (E ,e) (wB∧AwB)∧C¬AwB.
It states that player A ‘knows’ that player B has the white card but player C believes
that it is not the case.
3 Substructural Logics
Substructural logics are a family of logics lacking some of the structural rules of
classical logic. A structural rule is a rule of inference which is closed under sub-
stitution of formulas. The structural rules for classical logic are given in Figure 5
(U,X ,Y,Z denote L -structures). While (Weakening) and (Contraction) are often
dropped like in relevance logic and linear logic, the rule of (Associativity) is often
preserved. We shall see in this article that DEL invalidates all of them.
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Weakening: Associativity:
Y Z
X ,Y Z
WL
Y Z
Y Z,X
WR
X ,(Y,Z) U
(X ,Y ),Z U
B
Contraction: Commutativity:
(X ,X),Y Z
X ,Y Z
CL
Y Z,(X ,X)
Y Z,X
CR
Y,X Z
X ,Y Z
C
Fig. 5 Structural rules of classical logic
3.1 A Substructural Language
Our exposition of substructural logics is based on [57, 58, 39]. The logical frame-
work presented in [57] is much more general and studies a wide range of substruc-
tural logics: relevance logic, linear logic, lambek calculus, display logic, etc. . . For
what concerns us in this article, we will only introduce a fragment of this gen-
eral framework. The semantics of this fragment is based on the ternary relation
of the frame semantics for relevant logic originally introduced by Routley & Meyer
[60, 61, 59, 62]. Another semantics proposed independently by Urquhart [65, 63, 64]
at about the same time will be discussed at the end of this section.
Definition 8 (Language LSub and LSub–structure). The language LSub is de-
fined inductively as follows:
LSub : ϕ ::= > | ⊥ | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | ϕ ∨ϕ | ϕ |
ϕ ⊃ ϕ | ϕ ⊂ ϕ | ϕ ◦ϕ
where p ranges over AT M.
ALSub–structure is defined inductively as follows, with ϕ ranging overLSub:
X ::= ϕ | (X ,X) | (X ;X)
Definition 9 (Point set, plump accessibility relation). A point setP = (P,v) is a
set P together with a partial order v on P. The set Prop(P) of propositions onP
is the set of all subsets X of P which are closed upwards: that is, if x ∈ X and xv x′
then x′ ∈ X . We abusively write x ∈P for x ∈ P.
• A binary relationS is a positive two–place accessibility relation on the point set
P iff for any x,y ∈P where xS y, if x′ v x then there is a y′ w y, where x′S y′.
Similarly, if xS y and yv y′ then there is some x′ v x, where x′S y′.
• A ternary relation R is a three–place accessibility relation iff whenever Rxyz
and zv z′ then there are y′ w y and x′ v x, whereRx′y′z′. Similarly, if x′ v x then
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there are y′ v y and z′ w z, where Rx′y′z′, and if y′ v y then there are x′ v x and
z′ w z, whereRx′y′z′.
• A ternary relation R is a plump accessibility relation on the point set P if and
only if for any x,y,z,x′,y′,z′ ∈P such thatRxyz, if x′ v x, y′ v y and zv z′, then
Rx′y′z′.
Our definition of LSub–model corresponds to the definition of a model in [57,
Chap. 11] stripped out from all its truth sets. These other features are not needed for
what concerns us here.
Definition 10 (LSub–model). A LSub–model is a tuple MR = (P,S ,R,I )
where:
• P = (P,v) is a point set;
• S ⊆P×P is a positive two–place accessibility relation onP;
• R ⊆P×P×P is a three–place accessibility relation onP;
• I : P→ 2AT M is an interpretation function.
We abusively write x ∈MR for x ∈P , and (MR ,x) is called a pointed LSub–
model.
Note that in the above definition, there could be multiple positive two–place ac-
cessibility relationsS1, . . . ,Sn corresponding to multiple modalities 1, . . .n. We
refrain from definingLSub–models in their full generality in order to ease the read-
ability of the article.
Definition 11 (Truth conditions of LSub). Let MR be a LSub–model, x ∈MR
and ϕ ∈LSub. The relationMR ,x ϕ is defined inductively as follows:
MR ,x > always
MR ,x ⊥ never
MR ,x p iff p ∈I (x)
MR ,x ¬ϕ iff notMR ,x ϕ
MR ,x ϕ ∧ψ iff MR ,x ϕ andMR ,x ψ
MR ,x ϕ ∨ψ iff MR ,x ϕ orMR ,x ψ
MR ,x ϕ iff for all y ∈MR , where xS y,MR ,y ϕ
MR ,x ϕ ⊃ ψ iff for all y,z ∈P whereRxyz, ifMR ,y ϕ thenMR ,z ψ
MR ,x ψ ⊂ ϕ iff for all y,z ∈P whereRyxz ifMR ,y ϕ thenMR ,z ψ
MR ,x ϕ ◦ψ iff there are y,z ∈P such thatRyzx,MR ,y ϕ andMR ,z ψ
We extend the scope of the relation to also relate points toLSub–structures:
MR ,x X ,Y iff MR ,x X andMR ,x Y
MR ,x X ;Y iff there are y,z ∈MR such thatRyzx,MR ,y X andMR ,z Y
We say thatMR validates aLSub–structure X when for all x∈MR ,MR ,x X .
Let X be a structure and let ϕ ∈LSub. We say that X entails ϕ , written X ϕ , when
the following holds:
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X ϕ iff for all pointedLSub–model (MR ,x), ifMR ,x X , thenMR ,x ϕ.
Note that unlike many substructural logics, we use a Boolean negation. We list
below some key inferences of substructural logics, more precisely of the Lambek
Calculus:
ϕ;ψ χ iff ϕ ψ ⊃ χ (2)
ϕ ψ ⊃ χ iff ϕ ◦ψ χ (3)
ϕ ◦ψ χ iff ψ χ ⊂ ϕ (4)
ϕ ψ ⊃ χ iff ψ χ ⊂ ϕ (5)
Urquhart’s semantics
The Urquhart’s semantics for relevance logic was developed independently from the
Routley & Meyer’s semantics in the early 1970’s. An operational frame is a set of
pointsP together with a function which gives us a new point from a pair of points:
unionsq :P×P →P. (6)
An operational model is then an operational frame together with a relation
which indicates what formulas are true at what points. The truth conditions for the
implication ⊃ are defined as follows:
x ϕ ⊃ ψ iff for each y, if y ϕ then xunionsq y ψ (7)
As one can easily notice, an operational frame is a Routley & Meyer frame where
Rxyz holds if and only if xunionsq y = z. Hence, the ternary relation R of the Routley &
Meyer semantics is a generalization of the function unionsq of the Urquhart’s semantics.
Because it is a relation, it allows moreover to apply x to y and yield either a set of
outcomes or no outcome at all.
3.2 Updates as Ternary Relations
The ternary relationR of the Routley & Meyer semantics was introduced originally
for technical reasons: any 2-ary (n-ary) connective of a logical language can be given
a semantics by resorting to a 3-ary (resp. n+1-ary) relation on worlds. Subsequently,
a number of philosophical interpretations of this ternary relation have been proposed
and we will briefly recall some of them at the end of this section (see [18, 58,
50] for more details). However, one has to admit that providing a non-circular and
conceptually grounded interpretation of this relation remains problematic. In this
article, we propose a new dynamic interpretation of this relation, inspired by the
ternary semantics of DEL.
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First, one should observe that the DEL product update ⊗ of Definition 7 can be
seen as a partial function F from a pair of pointed L –model and pointed Lα–
model to another pointedL –model:
F : C ×Cα → C (8)
There is a formal similarity between this abstract definition of the DEL product
update and the function unionsq of Equation (6) introduced by Urquhart in the early 1970s
for providing a semantics to the implication of relevance logic. This similarity is not
only formal but also intuitively meaningful. Indeed, the intuitive interpretation of
the DEL product update operator is very similar to the intuitive interpretation of
the function unionsq of Urquhart. Points are sometimes also called “worlds”, “states”,
“situation”, “set-ups”, and as explained by Restall:
“We have a class of points (over which x and y vary), and a function unionsq which gives us new
points from old. The point xunionsqy is supposed, on Urquhart’s interpretation, to be the body of
information given by combining x with y.” [58, p. 363]
and also, keeping in mind the truth conditions for the connective ⊃ of Equation (7):
“To be committed to A⊃ B is to be committed to B whenever we gain the information that
A. To put it another way, a body of information warrants A ⊃ B if and only if whenever
you update that information with new information which warrants A, the resulting (perhaps
new) body of information warrants B.” (my emphasis) [58, p. 362]
From these two quotes, it is natural to interpret the DEL product update ⊗ of
Definition 7 as a specific kind of Urquhart’s function unionsq (Equation (6)). Moreover,
as explained by Restall, this substructural “update” can be nonmonotonic and may
correspond to some sort of revision:
“[C]ombination is sometimes nonmonotonic in a natural sense. Sometimes when a body
of information is combined with another body of information, some of the original body
of information might be lost. This is simplest to see in the case motivating the failure of
A B⊃ A. A body of information might tell us that A. However, when we combine it with
something which tells us B, the resulting body of information might no longer warrant A
(as A might with B). Combination might not simply result in the addition of information. It
may well warrant its revision.” (my emphasis) [58, p. 363]
Our dynamic interpretation of the ternary relation is consistent with the above
considerations: sometimes, updating beliefs amounts to revise beliefs. As it turns
out, belief revision has also been extensively studied within the DEL framework
and DEL has been extended to deal with this phenomenon [1, 36, 26, 13, 14, 46, 2].
More generally, an update can be seen as a partial function F from a pair of
pointedL –model and pointedLα–model to a set of pointedL –model:
F : C ×Cα →P(C ) (9)
Equivalently, an update can be seen as a ternary relationR defined on C ∪Cα be-
tween three pointed models ((M ,w),(E ,e),(M f ,w f )) where (M ,w) is a pointed
L –model, (E ,e) is a pointed Lα–model and (M f ,w f ) is another pointed L –
model:
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R ⊆ C ×Cα ×C (10)
The ternary relation of Equation (10) then resembles the ternary relation of the
Routley & Meyer semantics. This is not surprising since the Routley & Meyer se-
mantics generalizes the Urquhart semantics (they are essentially the same, since as
we explained it in the previous section, an operational frame is a Routley & Meyer
frame where Rxyz holds if and only if xunionsq y = z). Viewed from the perspective of
DEL, the ternary relation then represents a particular sort of update. With this inter-
pretation in mind,Rxyz reads as ‘the occurrence of event y in world x results in the
world z’ and the corresponding conditional α ⊃ ϕ reads as ‘the occurrence in the
current world of an event satisfying property α results in a world satisfying ϕ’.
The dynamic reading of the ternary relation and its corresponding conditional
is very much in line with the so-called “Ramsey Test” of conditional logic. The
Ramsey test can be viewed as the very first modern contribution to the logical study
of conditionals and much of the contemporary work on conditional logic can be
traced back to the famous footnote of Ramsey [55]. Roughly, it consists in defining
a counterfactual conditional in terms of belief revision: an agent currently believes
that ϕ would be true if ψ were true (i.e. ψ ⊃ ϕ) if and only if he should believe ϕ
after learning ψ . A first attempt to provide truth conditions for conditionals, based
on Ramsey’s ideas, was proposed by Stalnaker. He defined his semantics by means
of selection functions over possible worlds f : W × 2W →W . As one can easily
notice, Stalnaker’s selection functions could also be considered from a formal point
of view as a special kind of ternary relation, since a relationR f ⊆W ×2W ×W can
be canonically associated to each selection function f . Moreover, like the ternary
relation corresponding to a product update (Equation (10)), this ternary relation is
‘two-sorted’: the antecedent of a conditional takes value in a set of worlds (instead
of a single world).2 So, the dynamic reading of the ternary semantics is consistent
with the dynamic reading of conditionals proposed by Ramsey.
This dynamic reading was not really considered and investigated by substructural
logicians when they connected the substructural ternary semantics with conditional
logic [18]. On the other hand, the dynamic reading of inferences has been stressed
to a large extent by van Benthem [27, 30] (we will come back to this point in Section
4.2), and also by Baltag and Smets who distinguished dynamic belief revision from
static (standard) belief revision [12, 13, 14]. What distinguishes dynamic belief re-
vision from static belief revision is that the latter is a revision of the agent’s beliefs
about the state of the world as it was before an event, and the former is a revision
of the state of the world as it is after the event. Note, however, that this important
distinction between static belief revision and dynamic belief revision collapses in
the case of relevant logic, because in that case we only deal with propositional for-
mulas. This shows again that a dynamic interpretation of the ternary semantics of
substructural logic is consistent with the interpretations proposed by substructural
logicians.
2 Note that Burgess [35] already proposed a ternary semantics for conditionals, but his truth con-
ditions and his interpretation of the ternary relation were quite different from ours.
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To summarize our discussion, the DEL product update provides substructural
logics with an intuitive and consistent interpretation of its ternary relation. This
interpretation is consistent in the sense that the intuitions underlying the definitions
of the DEL framework are coherent with those underlying the ternary semantics of
substructural logic, as witnessed by our quotes and citations from the substructural
literature.
Other interpretations of the ternary relation
One interpretation, due to Barwise [15] and developed by Restall [56], takes worlds
to be ‘sites’ or ‘channels’, a site being possibly a channel and a channel being pos-
sibly a site. If x,y and z are sites, Rxyz reads as ‘x is a channel between y and z’.
Hence, if ϕ ⊃ ψ is true at channel x, it means that all sites y and z connected by
channel x are such that if ϕ is information available in y, then ψ is information
available in z. Another similar interpretation due to Mares [49] adapts Israel and
Perry’s theory of information [54] to the relational semantics. In this interpretation,
worlds are situations in the sense of Barwise and Perry’s situation semantics [16]
and pieces of information – called infons – can carry information about other in-
fons: an infon might carry the information that a red light on a mobile phone carries
the information that the battery of the mobile phone is low. In this interpretation,
the ternary relation R represents the informational links in situations: if there is an
informational link in situation x that says that an infon σ carries the information that
the infon pi also holds, then ifRxyz holds and y contains the infon σ , then z contains
the infon pi . Other interpretations of the ternary relation have been proposed in [18],
with a particular focus on their relation to conditionality.
4 DEL is a Substructural Logic
In this section, we will extend the languages L and Lα of Section 2 with the sub-
structural operators ◦,⊃ and ⊂. We will also provide a substructural semantics for
this language based on the idea to view an update as a ternary relation of a substruc-
tural frame (LSub–model). This idea is motivated and intuitively grounded in the
analysis of the previous section.
4.1 An Extended DEL Language
Our language extends both the languageL and the languageLα of Section 2. Like
our semantics, it is two-sorted: it contains both formulas ofL and formulas ofLα .
Definition 12 (Language LR). The language LR is two-sorted and is defined by
a double induction as follows:
Dynamic Epistemic Logic as a Substructural Logic 15
L 1R : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ | ϕ ∨ϕ |  jϕ | α ⊃ ϕ | ϕ ◦α
L 2R : α ::= pψ | ¬α | α ∧α | α ∨α |  jα | ϕ ⊂ ϕ
where p ranges over AT M, ψ ranges overL 1R and j over AGT . The abbreviations
ϕ → ψ,ϕ ↔ ψ and α → β ,α ↔ β are defined as in Definitions 1 and 4.
Definition 13 (LR–structure and LR–sequent). The LR–structures are defined
inductively as follows:
S1 : X ::= ϕ | (X ,X) | (X ;Xα)
S2 : X ::= ϕ | (X ,X)
where ϕ ranges overLR and Xα ranges overLα -structures. ALR–sequent is a
Lα–sequent or an expression of the form X Y , where X ∈S1, Y ∈S2.
Definition 14 (DEL product update model). The DEL product update model is the
tupleM⊗ = (P,R1, . . . ,Rm,R⊗,I ) where:
• P := (C ∪Cα ,-) where - is the bisimilarity relation;
• R j ⊆P ×P is a positive two-place accessibility relation on P for each j ∈
AGT such that for all x,y ∈P , where x = (Mx,wx) and y = (My,wy):
x ∈R j(y) iff Mx =My and wx ∈ R j(wy)
• R⊗ :=
{
(x,y,z) ∈ C ×Cα ×C
∣∣ x⊗ y = z} is a plump ternary relation onP;
• I (x) := I(x), for all x ∈ C ∪Cα .
The DEL product update model is a LSub–model where points are pointed L –
models and pointed Lα–models. The ternary relation R⊗ is defined and motivated
by the explanations of the previous section. Note that the accessibility relations R j of
L –models and Lα–models are seen in this definition as positive two-place acces-
sibility relationsR j. The truth conditions are the same as the ones forLR–models:
Definition 15 (Truth conditions of LR). Let M⊗ be the DEL product update
model, x ∈M⊗ and ϕ ∈ LR . The relation M⊗,x ϕ is defined inductively as
follows:
M⊗,x p iff p ∈I (x)
M⊗,x ¬ϕ iff notM⊗,x ϕ
M⊗,x ϕ ∧ψ iff M⊗,x ϕ andM⊗,x ψ
M⊗,x ϕ ∨ψ iff M⊗,x ϕ orM⊗,x ψ
M⊗,x  jϕ iff for all y ∈P such that xR jy,M⊗,y ϕ
M⊗,x α ⊃ ψ iff for all y,z ∈P such thatR⊗xyz, ifM⊗,y α thenM⊗,z ψ
M⊗,x ψ ⊂ ϕ iff for all y,z ∈P such thatR⊗yxz, ifM⊗,y ϕ thenM⊗,z ψ
M⊗,x ϕ ◦α iff there are y,z ∈P such thatR⊗yzx,M⊗,y ϕ andM⊗,z α
We extend the scope of the relation to also relate points toLR–structures:
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M⊗,x X ,Y iff M⊗,x X andM⊗,x Y
M⊗,x X ;Y iff there are y,z ∈MR such thatRyzx,M⊗,y X andM⊗,z Y
Let C ⊆ C ∪Cα be a class of pointed L -models or Lα -models, and let X ϕ
be aLR–sequent. We say that X entails ϕ in the class C, written X C ϕ , when the
following holds:
X C ϕ iff for all x ∈C, ifM⊗,x X thenM⊗,x ϕ .
We also write X ϕ for X C∪Cα ϕ .
Naturally, the truth conditions for coincide with the truth conditions for
if we only consider epistemic or event formulas:
Proposition 1. Let M⊗ be the DEL product update model, ϕ ∈ L and x ∈M⊗
such that x ∈ C . Then,M⊗,x ϕ iff x ϕ . Let α ∈Lα and let y ∈M⊗ such that
y ∈ Cα . Then,M⊗,y α iff y α .
Remark 1. The frame semantics of substructural logic is very abstract and general
and it provides a rich framework which captures a wide range of logics, such as
arrow logic [23, Chap. 8], action frames and domain space (see [57, Example 11.12–
11.15] for more details). But the epistemic temporal models of ETL [53] (which
have been related to DEL in [33, 32]) can also be viewed as models of the ternary
semantics of substructural logic [5].
4.2 DEL Operators are Substructural Operators
In this section, we will show that the DEL operators introduced in [3, 4] correspond
to the substructural operators ◦,⊃ and ⊂. We will also relate the work of van Ben-
them on dynamic inference with the DEL–sequents of [3, 4, 7].
4.2.1 Dynamic Inferences and DEL–sequents
Dynamic Inferences
In the so-called ‘dynamic turn’, van Benthem was interested in various dynamic
styles of inference where propositions are procedures changing information states.
These dynamic styles of inference differ greatly from the classical Tarskian’s valid
inferences because the latter are supposed to transmit and preserve truth. Among
various dynamic styles of inference (such as the so-called test-test, update-update
or update-test consequence [21, 23, 51]), he studied the concrete following one,
which can be defined within the DEL framework:
Definition 16 (Dynamic inference [25]). Let ϕ0,ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,ψ ∈L . We define the
dynamic inference ϕ0,ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn ψ as follows:
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ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn ϕ iff for all pointedL –model (M ,w), and public announce-
ment Lα–models (E1,e1), . . . ,(En,en) of ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn re-
spectively, (M ,w)⊗ (E1,e1)⊗ . . .⊗ (En,en) ϕ .
van Benthem noticed that various dynamic styles of inference obey structural
rules of inference which are non-classical. For example, all the structural rules of
classical logic of Figure 5 fail for dynamic inference, but the structural rules below
characterize completely the dynamic inference [25] (below, −→ϕ stands for ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn
and −→ψ stands for ψ1, . . . ,ψn, where ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,ψ1, . . . ,ψn ∈L ):
if −→ϕ ϕ then ψ,−→ϕ ϕ (Left-Monotonicity)
if −→ϕ ϕ and −→ϕ ,ϕ,−→ψ ψ then −→ϕ ,−→ψ ψ (Left-Cut)
if −→ϕ ϕ and −→ϕ ,−→ψ ψ then −→ϕ ,ϕ,−→ψ ψ (Cautious Monotonicity)
DEL–sequents
In [3], I introduced what I called DEL–sequents. They are a particular sort of dy-
namic inference and are defined as follows:
Definition 17 (DEL–sequent [3]). Let ϕ,ϕ f ∈L and α ∈Lα . We define the log-
ical consequence relation ϕ,α ϕ f as follows:
ϕ,α ϕ f iff for all pointed L –model (M ,w), all Lα–model (E ,e) such that
M ,w I(e), M ,w ϕ and E ,e α , it holds that (M ,w)⊗
(E ,e) ϕ f .
In [7], DEL–sequents are generalized to take into account sequences of events
and not only ‘one-shot’ occurrence of events. Several generalized DEL–sequents
are introduced in [7] but they are all reducible to the following one:
Definition 18 (Generalized DEL–sequent [7]). Let ϕ0, . . . ,ϕn ∈L , let α1, . . . ,αn ∈
Lα and let ψ ∈L . Then,
ϕ0,α1,ϕ1, . . . ,αn,ϕn ψ
iff
if for all pointedL –model (M ,w), andLα–models (E1,e1), . . . ,(En,en)
such that for all i∈{1, . . . ,n}, Ei,ei αi, (M ,w)⊗(E1,e1)⊗ . . .⊗(Ei,ei)
is defined and makes ϕi true, then it holds that (M ,w)⊗ (E1,e1)⊗ . . .⊗
(En,en) ψ .
As one can easily notice, dynamic inferences can be translated into DEL–
sequents if we resort to the common knowledge/belief operator ∗AGTϕ (see for
example [41] for a definition and a detailed study of this operator):
Proposition 2. Let ϕ0,ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,ϕ ∈L . Then, the following holds:
ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn ϕ iff >, pϕ1 ∧∗AGT pϕ1 , . . . ,>, pϕn ∧∗AGT pϕn ,> ϕ ∧∗AGTϕ
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Thus, DEL–sequents are more expressive than dynamic inferences, and also
more abstract because they ‘operate’ at a deeper level, a semantical one. It is this
more general and abstract approach towards dynamic styles of inference that will
allow us to relate more precisely and closely DEL with substructural logics, and
explain to a certain extent why the substructural phenomena occurring in dynamic
inferences and observed by van Benthem arise.
4.2.2 DEL–sequents for Progression, Regression and Epistemic Planning
Substructural logics and dynamic logics of information flow are long-standing in-
terests of van Benthem [22, 23, 25, 27, 29, 30]. Recently again [29], he expressed
some worries about interpreting the Lambek Calculus (the paradigmatic substruc-
tural logic) as a base logic of information flow while trying to connect the operators
◦,⊃ and ⊂ of substructural logic to some sort of DEL operators. Indeed, the DEL
operators usually rely on the regular algebra of sequential composition, choice and
iteration which are of a quite different nature. Recently, I introduced some DEL op-
erators called progression, regression and epistemic planning [3, 4], the operator of
regression being a natural generalization of the standard and original action modal-
ity [E ,e]ϕ of DEL [17]. It turns out that these operators can all be identified with
connectives of the substructural language LR . We first briefly recall their defini-
tions below and then we give our correspondence results between the two kinds of
operators.
Progression
The operator of progression is denoted ⊗ in [3]. In [4, Def. 41], a constructive def-
inition of this operator is provided using characteristic formulas (called “Kit Fine”
formulas). Here, we provide an alternative and non–constructive definition of the
progression of ϕ by α , denoted ϕ⊗α:
Theorem 1. Let (M f ,w f ) be a pointed L –model and let ϕ ∈ L and α ∈ Lα .
Then,
M f ,w f ϕ⊗α iff there is a pointedL –model (M ,w) and a pointed
Lα–model (E ,e) such that (M ,w)⊗ (E ,e)- (M f ,w f ),
M ,w ϕ and E ,e α
Proof. It follows from Lemmata 43 and 44 of [3].
Epistemic Planning
The operator of epistemic planning is denoted P in [4]. It is defined relatively to a
finite set P of formulas/preconditions/atomic events. In [4, Def. 14–15], a construc-
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tive definition of this operator is provided using characteristic formulas (called “Kit
Fine” formulas). As it turns out, an alternative and non–constructive definition of
the epistemic planning from ϕ to ϕ f , denoted ϕP ϕ f , exists as well:
Theorem 2 ([4]). Let ϕ,ϕ f ∈ L and let P be a finite subset of L . Then, for all
P–completeLα–model (E ,e), it holds that
E ,e ϕP ϕ f iff there is (M ,w) such thatM ,w ϕ,M ,w I(e) and (M ,w)⊗ (E ,e) ϕ f
The dual of the operator ϕP ϕ f is defined by:
ϕ[]Pϕ f := ¬(ϕP¬ϕ f ) (11)
Theorem 2 entails that ϕ[]Pϕ f can be alternatively defined as follows: for all
P–completeLα–model (E ,e), it holds that
E ,e ϕ[]Pϕ f iff for all (M ,w) such that M ,w ϕ , if
M ,w I(e) then (M ,w)⊗ (E ,e) ϕ f
(12)
Example 4. In the situation depicted in the L -model of Figure 1, agent B does not
know that agent A has the red card and does not know that agent C has the blue
card: M ,w (♦BrA ∧♦B¬rA)∧ (♦BbC ∧♦B¬bC). Our problem is therefore the
following:
What sufficient and necessary property (i.e. ‘minimal’ property) an event should
fulfill so that its occurence in the initial situation (M ,w) results in a situation
where agent B knows the true state of the world, i.e. agent B knows that agent A
has the red card and that agent C has the blue card?
The answer to this question obviously depends on the kind of atomic events we
consider. In this example, the events P= {pbC , prA , pwB} under consideration are the
following. First, agent C shows her blue card (pbC ), second, agent A shows her red
card (prA ), and third, agent B herself shows her white card (pwB ). Answering this
question amounts to compute the formula (M,w)P B (rA∧bC ∧wB). Applying
the algorithm of [4, Definition 15], we obtain that
(M ,w)PB (rA∧bC ∧wB)↔B(pbC ∨ prA) is valid.
In other words, this result states that agent B should believe either that agent A
shows her red card or that agent C shows her blue card in order to know the true state
of the world. Indeed, since there are only three different cards which are known by
the agents and agent B already knows her card, if she learns the card of (at least)
one of the other agents, she will also be able to infer the card of the third agent.
Regression
The operator of regression is denoted  in [3]. In [4, Def. 41], a constructive def-
inition of this operator is provided using characteristic formulas (called “Kit Fine”
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formulas) by adapting and translating the reduction axioms of [17]. As it turns out,
an alternative and non–constructive definition of the regression of ϕ f by α , denoted
αϕ f , exists as well:
Theorem 3. Let α ∈Lα and ϕ f ∈L . Then, for allL -model (M ,w), it holds that
M ,w αϕ f iff there is (E ,e) such that E ,e α,M ,w I(e) and (M ,w)⊗ (E ,e) ϕ f
Note that we could define a dual operator of αϕ f as follows:
α[]ϕ f = ¬(α¬ϕ f ) (13)
Then, the counterpart of Theorem 3 for this dual operator is as follows:
M ,w α[]ϕ f iff for all (E ,e) such that E ,e α,ifM ,w I(e) then (M ,w)⊗ (E ,e) ϕ f (14)
As shown in [4, Sec. 6], the operator α[]ϕ f is a generalization of the origi-
nal and more standard DEL operator [E ,e]ϕ almost exclusively used in the DEL
literature [17].
Correspondence between DEL and Substructural Operators
As one can easily notice, there is a strong similarity between the operations of
progression, epistemic planning and regression and the operations of substructural
logic, more precisely of the Lambek Calculus. In fact, there exists a rigorous map-
ping between them, as the following theorem shows:
Theorem 4. Let P be a finite subset ofL , let x = (M ,w) ∈ C and let y = (E ,e) ∈
C Pα be a P-complete pointed event model. Let ϕ,ψ ∈L and let α ∈Lα . Then,
M⊗,x ϕ ◦α iff x ϕ⊗α
M⊗,x α ⊃ ϕ iff x α[]ϕ
M⊗,y ψ ⊂ ϕ iff y ϕ[]Pψ
Moreover, for all α,α1, . . . ,αn ∈Lα , for all ϕ,ψ,ϕ0,ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn ∈L , we have:
ϕ;α ψ iff ϕ,α ψ
(((ϕ0;α1),ϕ1); . . . ;αn),ϕn ψ iff ϕ0,α1,ϕ1, . . . ,αn,ϕn ψ
The key Theorem 42 of [3] relates DEL–sequents and the operator of progres-
sion: for all ϕ,ϕ f ∈L and α ∈Lα , it holds that
ϕ,α ϕ f iff ϕ⊗α ϕ f . (15)
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Substructural operators DEL operators
◦ ⊗
⊃ []
⊂ []
Fig. 6 Correspondence between DEL and substructural operators
As it turns out, this theorem is also valid in any substructural logic: it corre-
sponds to the theorem of Equation (2). More generally, all the theorems of the non-
associative Lambek calculus hold in our DEL setting if we use the translation given
in Figure 6. In particular, we have the following results which are the counterparts
of Equations (3), (4) and (5) in our setting:
Corollary 1. Let P be a finite subset ofL . For all ϕ,ϕ f ∈L and α ∈Lα , it holds
that
ϕ;α ϕ f iff ϕ α[]ϕ f (16)
ϕ α[]ϕ f iff ϕ⊗α ϕ f (17)
ϕ⊗α ϕ f iff α C Pα ϕ[]Pϕ f (18)
ϕ α[]ϕ f iff α C Pα ϕ[]Pϕ f (19)
5 Conclusion
We proved in this article that DEL is a two-sorted substructural logic. Also, we
argued in Section 3.2 that our embedding of DEL within the framework of substruc-
tural logic is intuitively consistent, in the sense that in this embedding the intuitions
underlying the DEL framework are coherent with the intuitive interpretations pro-
posed for the ternary semantics of substructural logics. This may explain to a certain
extent why some substructural phenomena arise in the dynamic inferences of Sec-
tion 4.2.1. As observed by van Benthem, “it seemed that structural rules address
mere symptoms of some underlying phenomenon” [30, p. 297]. I claim that these
“symptoms” are caused at a deeper semantic level by the fact that an update, and
in that case the DEL product update, can be represented by the ternary relation of
substructural logics.
In a certain sense, this article is in line with the approach of van Benthem [28, 30]
and contributes to relate even more closely the research programs of Logical Plural-
ism [19] and Logical Dynamics [30]. Roughly, the informal idea underpinning the
connection between these two logical paradigms is to consider different reasoning
styles and their corresponding consequence relations as the result of different sorts
of updates induced by various informational tasks (such as observation, memory,
questions and answers, dialogue, or general communication). We showed in this ar-
ticle that this approach is not only meaningful from an intuitive point of view, but
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it can also be realized at a formal level if the ternary relation of substructural logic
is interpreted intuitively as a sort of update. So, we hope that our embedding will
strengthen the connections between the two areas of research represented by Logi-
cal Pluralism (and substructural logics) on the one hand and Logical Dynamics on
the other hand. In fact, our point of view is also very much in line with the claim
of Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson [44, 48] that non-monotonic reasoning and belief revi-
sion are “two sides of the same coin”: as a matter of fact, non-monotonic reasoning
is a reasoning style and belief revision is a sort of update. Likewise, the formal
connection in this case also relies on a similar idea based on the Ramsey test.
In this article, we focused our attention on the DEL product update. It is, how-
ever, a particular kind of update operator and the ternary relation of substructural
logics could actually be a representation of any sort of update, including the various
revision and update operators which have been studied in the logics of “common
sense reasoning” of artificial intelligence and philosophical logic, such as condi-
tional logic [52], default and non-monotonic logics [47, 42], belief revision theory
[43], etc. . . Different kinds of updates, induced by different informational tasks, de-
fine different kinds of reasoning styles. If one adheres to our interpretation of the
ternary relation, the dynamic notion of update then becomes the foundational con-
cept of substructural logics.
This observation gives rise, in turn, to a research thread where updates are the
central objects of study and where we can (re-)analyze various updates within the
generic and abstract logical framework of substructural logics. This research thread
is of course very much in line with van Benthem’s long standing interest in informa-
tion and logical dynamics, but also with his interest in modal correspondence theory,
the area of logic where he first contributed [20, 24]. For example, we could elicit
a number of axioms and inference rules that define specific properties of updates,
some being possibly satisfied by the DEL product update. In other words, we could
develop a correspondence theory for analyzing and studying the notion of update
similar to the correspondence theory developed by van Benthem [20, 24] for modal
logic. A basic correspondence theory with a complete characterization of the DEL
product update in terms of axioms and inference rules is given in [5].
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